Epistemology or the theory of Knowledge. Coffey P

95. TRANSITION TO SENSE PERCEPTION. TERMS AND
DISTINCTIONS.
96. DATA, INTERPRETATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF CON
SCIOUSNESS.
97. TRUTHS REVEALED BY INTROSPECTIVE RATIONAL AN
ALYSIS OF THE DATA OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
98. MEMORY, SELF-IDENTITY, AND TIME DURATION.
99. TRUTHS REVEALED BY INTROSPECTIVE RATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA OF MEMORY.
ioo. CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF AND COGNITION OF THE
EXTERNAL UNIVERSE.
10 1. REALITY OF THE COGNITIVE ACTS OR STATES OF THE
" EGO," COMPARED WITH REALITY OF THEIR OBJECTS.
102. Is THE REALITY ("ESSE") OF CONSCIOUS STATES
IDENTICAL WITH THEIR APPREHENSION (" PERCIPI ") ?
103. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF JUSTIFYING SPONTANEOUS
BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXTERNAL MATERIAL
UNIVERSE. (A) TRANSITION EFFECTED BY APPEAL TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.
104. CRITICISM OF FIRST ALTERNATIVE.
105. (B} SPONTANEOUS CONVICTION OF THE EXISTENCE
OF AN EXTERNAL MATERIAL UNIVERSE RATIONALLY JUSTI
FIED BY INTELLECTUAL REFLECTION ON THE NATURE AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF EXTERNAL SENSE DATA.
1 06. THE FACTS OF SENSE PERCEPTION.
107. THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND THEIR
SIGNIFICANCE FOR EPISTEMOLOGY.
1 08. THE PROBLEMS AND THE THEORIES.
109. DIRECT VINDICATION OF BELIEF IN THE REAL EX
ISTENCE OF A MIND-INDEPENDENT, EXTERNAL, EXTENDED,
MATERIAL UNIVERSE.
1 10. SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL A PRIORI DIFFICULTY OF
IDEALISM AGAINST THIS BELIEF.
111. INDIRECT CONFIRMATION OF THIS BELIEF BY APPEAL
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.
ii2. Two REALIST THEORIES OF SENSE PERCEPTION.
113. THEIR BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF ITS VALIDITY.
1 14. RELATION OF " PROPER " AND " COMMON " SENSIBLES,
Of "SENSIBILIA PER SE" AND " SENSIBILIA PER ACCIDENS" TO
INTELLECT.
115. EXTRAMENTAL REALITY OF THE "COMMON" SEN-
SIBLES, OR " PRIMARY " SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED.
116. DISTINCTION OF PERCEIVER S ORGANISM OR BODY
FROM THE "EXTERNAL" UNIVERSE.
117. ROLE OF PERCEIVER S ORGANISM AS PARTIAL DETER
MINANT OF "EXTERNAL" SENSE QUALITIES.
1 1 8. RELATIVITY OF EXTERNAL SENSE QUALITIES TO
PERCEIVER S ORGANISM. SENSE ILLUSIONS AND DECEPTIONS.
" INFALLIBILITY" OF PERCEPTION.
119. CONDITIONS OF " NORMAL" AND " ABNORMAL" SENSE
PERCEPTION.
120. EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPORT OF THE DISTINCTION.
121. THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL SENSE PERCEPTION IN
VOLVES RELATIVITY OF ALL EXTERNAL SENSE QUALITIES
(INCLUDING CONCRETE EXTERNALITY ITSELF) TO PERCEIVER S
122. IN NORMAL CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION THIS RELA
TIVITY is COMPATIBLE WITH EXTERNAL REALITY OF SENSE
QUALITIES.
123. SECONDARY QUALITIES ARE NO LESS EXTERNALLY
REAL, AND NO MORE DEPENDENT ON PERCEIVER FOR WHAT
THEY ARE PERCEIVED TO BE, THAN PRIMARY QUALITIES.
BERKELEY S IMMATERIALISM.
124. PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND THE SENSE QUALITIES. PRE
SUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. PHYSICAL REALISM.
125. IDEALISM AND THE SENSE QUALITIES. ABUSE OF
"INFERENCE BY SIMILARITY" FROM "REPRESENTATIONS".
126. GENERAL DIFFICULTIES AGAINST CRITICAL PERCEP-
TIONISM.
127. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY.
128. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT
THINGS "ARE" AND WHAT THEY "APPEAR".
129. How KANT DERIVES TWO "THINGS" FROM ONE
" APPEARING THING ".
130. GENERAL VIEW OF KANT S DOCTRINE OF SENSE
PERCEPTION.
131. KANT S ACCOUNT OF "FORMS OF INTUITION" CON
FUSED AND AMBIGUOUS.
132. SPACE NOT AN A PRIORI PKRCKFTION. ANALYSIS OF
KANT S ARGUMENTS.
133. SPACE NOT A PROPERTY OF MERE MENTAL APPEAR
ANCES OR " PHENOMENA," BUT OF MATERIAL REALITIES.
134. KANT S DOCTRINE OF TIME AS AN A PRIORI FORM
OF " INTERNAL " PERCEPTION.
135. THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. TRUE AND
FALSE RELATIVISMS.
136. EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DISTINCTION
BETWEEN SENSE AND INTELLECT.
137. VALIDITY OF CONCEPTS REVIEWED.
138. TRUTH OF CONTINGENT JUDGMENTS ABSOLUTE.
139. TRUTH OF NECESSARY JUDGMENTS ABSOLUTE.
140. SOME RELATIVIST DIFFICULTIES.
141. SCHOLASTICISM AND KANTIAN RELATIVISM.
142. THE EVOLUTIONARY FORM OF RELATIVISM.
143. TRUTHS OVERLOOKED OR PERVERTED IN THE EVOLU
TIONARY THEORY.
144. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY.
145. OBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH.
146. DEFINITION OF TRUTH.
147. THE OBJECTIVE TERM OF THE TRUTH-RELATION is
EXTRAMENTAL, REAL, AND ATTAINABLE. KANT S VIEW OF
TRUTH.
148. CRITERIA OF TRUTH AND MOTIVES OF CERTITUDE.
149. EVIDENCE AS THE SUPREME CRITERION OF TRUTH
AND THE ULTIMATE MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.
150. APPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE TO MEDIATE EVI
DENCE.
151. APPLICATION TO IMMEDIATE SENSE EVIDENCE.
152. APPLICATION TO IMMEDIATE INTELLECTUAL EVI
DENCE OF PRINCIPLES OF THE IDEAL ORDER.
153. "TESTING" EVIDENCE. INFALLIBILITY OF INTEL
LECT.
154. REFLECTION SHOWS THE COGENT EVIDENCE FOR
SPONTANEOUS ASSENTS TO BE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR
REASONED CERTITUDE.
155. OTHER TESTS. SPENCER. DESCARTES. "CIRCULAR"
THEORIES.
1 56. CONSISTENCY AS A TEST OF TRUTH. RELATIVIST AND
HEGELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF TRUTH AS CONSISTENCY.
157. FIDEISM: HISTORICAL CAUSES.
158. EXPOSITION OF TRADITIONALIST THEORIES.
159. GKNERAL CRITICISM OF TRADITIONALIST THEORIES.
160. EXAMINATION OF DE BONALD S THEORY.
161. THEORY OF DE LAMENNAIS EXAMINED. GENERAL
ASSENT AS A TEST OF TRUTH.
162. "COMMON SENSE" AS A CRITERION: THE SCOTTISH
SCHOOL. NATURAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE.
163. MODIFIED TRADITIONALISM. ITS SOUL OF TRUTH.
TRADITIONALISM, RATIONALISM, AND CATHOLIC TEACHING.
164. SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF ANTI-!NTELLECTUALIST
THEORIES OF CERTITUDE. GENERAL ARGUMENT AGAINST
SENTIMENTALIST AND VOLUNTARIST THEORIES.
165. VOLUNTARIST OBJECTIONS. MISCONCEPTION OF L-
TELLECTUALISM.
1 66. KANT S MORAL DOGMATISM OF THE PRACTICAL REASON.
167. CRITIQUE OF MORAL DOGMATISM. THE "CATE
GORICAL IMPERATIVE" AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.
1 68. THE Two CRITIQUES COMPARED. INCONSISTENCIES
or KANT S SYSTEM AS A WHOLE.
169. LATER ANTI-!NTKLLKCTUALIST THEORIES: SOCIAL
DOGMATISM. CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS
170. OUTLINE OF PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM.
171. GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRAGMATISM.
172. THE PRAGMATIST CRITERION EXAMINED. SPECIAL
ARGUMENT OUTLINED.
173. CONCLUSION. POSSIBILITY AND SOURCES OF ERROR.
THE PROBLEMS OF EITSTEMOLOGY.